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Abstract: 
Within the period of thirty-nine years, 1960-1999, the Nigerian military ruled the 
country for twenty nine years in a series of coups and counter coup. These coups 
brought one military government to replace another. These replacements did not 
convince anyone that the military was sincere to hand over power to the civilians, even 
when some military governments promised or began the process of transition. Ironsi 
government promised but was not even allowed to draw up a transition programme 
before it was overthrown. Another military, Gowon, promised to hand over 
government but later postponed indefinitely the transition programme. This shows lack 
of commitment and insincerity. Mohammed learnt a big lesson from Gowon's failure. 
He overthrew Gowon and started in earnest the process of transition, but again the 
Nigerian military over threw him and punctuated the transition. Obasanjo derived so 
many lessons from all of these occurrences and pursued with vigour his transition 
programme and handed over to a civil rule even though he was not sincere about 
transition. Again the military over threw the Shagari government. Buhari did not 
commit himself to hand over power before Babangida over threw him. Babangida tried 
to transform into civilian president. His attempt failed. But Abacha was not wise 
enough. After pushing out Shonekan, his attempt to transform into a civilian President 
was brought to an end by death. Abdulsalami like Obasanjo got the lesson and in a 
show of determination to prevent another coup, quickly proceeded with transition 
which brought into power Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as a civilian President under PDP. 
Thus, circumstances and not sincerity compelled Obasanjo and Abdulsalami to hand 
over power in 1979 and 1999 respectively. 
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Introduction  
 
Within the thirty-nine (39) years of Nigeria's political history, 1960-1999, there was 
twenty-nine (29) years of military rule, with about ten (10) years of civilian rule. During 
the twenty-nine years of military rule, eight military governments emerged and held on 
to power for varying periods of time. Out of the ten years of civil rule, the first 5years 
3months, from October 1, 1960 after Nigeria's independence was uninterrupted until 
the army struck on January 15, 1966. This period was followed by another period of 
four years and 3months of civil rule from October 1, 1979 to December 31, 1983. Then in 
1993, there was an Interim Civil Government that lasted for just three months. 
 And within the twenty-nine years of military rule, eight military governments 
emerged at different times. Seven out of these governments promised to hand over 
power but only two governments fulfilled their promises. One government did not 
make any promise of transition inspite of the fact that it was in power for one year eight 
months. 
 This paper analyses the circumstance of each of the military governments in 
order to be able to ascertain the level of commitment and sincerity to embark on 
transition. It identifies the governments that failed to transit and deduces the reasons 
for their failure. 
 
Military Governments of Aguiyi-Ironsi and Yakubu Gowon, 1966-1975 
 
Johnson T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi became the first military Head of State, following an aborted 
coup on January 15, 1966 which was carried out by five Majors in the Nigerian Army.1 
Since the coup failed; Ironsi was saddled with the responsibility of heading the new 
military, being the most senior military officer in the country. Meanwhile tension began 
to mount in the northern region over the killing of prominent political leaders from the 
north, in the bloody coup of January 1966, which was considered as an attempt to 
maginalise the north for Igbo power.2Ironsi decided to embark on the tour of the 
country as a way of reconciling the ethnic groups. The tour afforded the head of state, 
the opportunity to assess the views of the people, especially the traditional leaders, and 
leaders of thought and the political leaders on a return of power to the civilians. On 
February 21, 1966, he announced his programme of transition which would take place 
in three stages.3 Part of the programme was the decision to free political prisoners but 
the government did not do this before it was ousted on July 29, 1966. 
 Much as the transition programme was welcomed since the government also 
promised to stay in power for only three years,4Aguiyi-Ironsi's lack of determination to 
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hand over power was exposed by the decision of the same government to restructure 
the federal system by reducing the status of the four regions to the level of provinces 
under the central or national government. If the restructuring process was allowed to 
take its full course, the government of Ironsi would have remained in power for more 
than six years. As such, the promise to hand over power after three years would not 
have been achieved. In any case, the decision to adopt a central, national government 
was an invitation to chaos. 
 When Lt Col Yakubu Gowon emerged as the new Head of State after the bloody 
coup that ousted General Aguiyi-Ironsi from power on July 29, 1966, he promised to 
hand over power when he read his maiden address to the nation. He abrogated decree 
No.34 on the Unitary or national government and upheld the federal system.5This was a 
turnaround decision by Yakubu Gowon who was a part of the Ironsi government. The 
quick turnaround was perhaps, meant to dowse tension in the country especially 
among the civilian political class. Again on October 1, 1970, after the Nigerian Civil 
War, Gowon reiterated his promise to return power to the civilian political class by 
presenting nine point programme which was expected to terminate in 1976.6 He 
released from prison, six prominent political prisoners including Obafemi Awolowo 
and Anthony Enahoro who the Ironsi government took the decision to release but could 
not release before the government was ousted. But having witnessed the pleasantries of 
his office for four years after the hardship that accompanied the period of civil war, 
Gowon suddenly changed his mind on his earlier promise to the nation to hand over 
power in 1976. 1970 ushered in the beginning of the era of oil boom when the revenue 
accruing from the sale of crude oil was enormous, and was running into hundreds of 
millions of Naira. It was also a time when the value of the Naira to the pound sterling 
was at par. Thus, Gowon felt that he needed to enjoy the good times in office for a 
while. Therefore he announced to Nigerians and indeed to the whole world in 1975 that 
1976, the earlier promised handling over date was unrealistic.7 
 It has been argued that Gowon was under pressure from several quarters to 
extend the transition date. The view stated that top ranking civil servants, and those 
who held key appointments in the Gowon government and who were not ambitious to 
go into civil power politics cited the 1973 National Population Census and the erupting 
disputes over this census results used it as excuse. Also, some military Governors and 
other corrupt office holders did not want Gowon to hand over power soon. Samuel 
Ogbemudia was cited as one of the military Governors who persuaded Gowon to 
shelve the idea of transition.8Other reasons included: Nigeria as the 7th largest exporter 
of crude petroleum oil; the largest exporter of cocoa in Africa with enormous increase in 
the production and exportation of groundnuts, cotton and coal. In addition, the Udoji 
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salary increase to Federal Civil Servants was a way of keeping them silent and ensuring 
that they supported the postponement of the transition programme. 
 It follows therefore that though both the governments of Aguiyi-Ironsi and 
Yakubu Gowon showed some commitments to transition programmes, but those were 
not strong enough to withstand and overcome other considerations and pressures 
which derailed the transition. Ironsi was reluctant to hand over power that was why he 
brought in the idea of restructuring the federal system so as to have a national or 
unitary system through a process which would have exceed three years. Gowon 
shelved the idea of handing over to an indefinite time due to pressure from within the 
government and because of the grandeur of his office caused by improved economy. 
 
The Military Government of Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo 
 
Major General Murtala Mohammed emerged as the Head of State of Nigeria following 
the military coup of July 29, 1975 which overthrew the military government of General 
Yakubu Gowon. Mohammed emerged from the position of experience and knowledge 
which he acquired while he was part of the Gowon government and a silent watcher of 
the Ironsi government. Upon assuming power, Mohammed announced his plan to 
begin a transition programme. He matched his words with action when he commenced 
consultations with leaders of civil societies, political leaders, religious leaders and other 
leaders of thought between July 29 and October 18, 1975 Mohammed inaugurated a 
Constitution Drafting Committee which was empowered to recommend the system of 
government for the new political dispensation. The committee recommended an 
executive presidential system.9 
 Also, in order to facilitate the transition in good time, the government set up a 
Constituent Assembly to study and implement the report of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee. The last major activity on the transition programme which was executed by 
the Mohammed government was the creation of seven additional states, on February 3, 
1976.10 This brought the total number of states in the country to 19 states. Ten days after 
this major event, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated in a failed military coup, led by 
Dimka.11 
 There is no doubt that Mohammed was determined to hand over power by 1979 
judging by the way he addressed his government to the transition programme, 
following it step by step. The failure of the Gowon government to adhere to his promise 
to hand over power in 1976 remained a reference point and the source of determination 
to the Mohammed government. It would be recalled that Mohammed was part of the 
coup plotters that ousted Ironsi government, for attempting to change the course of the 
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political history of Nigeria. And according to Ardo, it was the failure of Gowon to keep 
to his handing over programme that instigated the overthrow of his government led by 
Mohammed who felt betrayed by the failure of Gowon to keep to his promise. 
 Thus, Mohammed derived his determination to hand over power from the 
failure of the Ironsi and Gowon governments. But as determined as Mohammed was, 
on the issue of transition he neglected his personal security, thereby giving opportunity 
to military officers who were loyal to Gowon to assassinate him in an attempt to bring 
back Gowon to power. 
 Even though Mohammed was assassinated, his government could not be 
overthrown. As such Obasanjo, who was the second in command to Mohammed, 
emerged as the new Head of State.12 Obasanjo had sufficient lessons to learn from the 
various coups that occurred in Nigeria since 1966. But more importantly, he was aware 
that adhering strictly to the transition programme of his predecessor was very 
paramount to the survival of his government. So, in his maiden address, Obasanjo 
promised to continue with the policies and programmes of the Mohammed 
government, particularly to hand over power on October 1, 1979. For instance, the 
Constitution Drafting Committee which was inaugurated by Mohammed on October 
18, 1975 continued its task and submitted the draft constitution on September 14, 1976.13 
Even though Obasanjo promised to release the report for public debate in another one 
month, he actually released it on October 7, 1976, which was less than a month that he 
promised. Similarly, the debate on the draft constitution was brought to an end in less 
than a year and the new constitution was signed into law on September 21, 1978.14 Thus, 
the hast with which Obasanjo carried on the transition programme, pointed to the fact 
that he was in a hurry to hand over power. This marked the commencement of Political 
activities in the country as political parties began to emerge. The Federal Electoral 
Commission drew up the election timetable for the conduct of various elections from 
the senatorial elections on July 7, 1979 to the Presidential election on August 11, 
1979.15Obasanjo government gave the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) all the 
support and cooperation it needed to stick to its time table. It was no surprise therefore 
that on August 15, 1979 FEDECO declared Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria as 
the winner of the Presidential election. However, that election result was roundly 
rejected by all the other major political parties such as Unity Party of Nigeria, Nigerian 
People Party, United Nigeria Peoples Party, and Peoples Redemption Party. The main 
point in contention was what constituted 2/3 of 19 states.16 The position of FEDECO was 
that since Shagari won in 12 states which was the closest to 12.67 states or 2/3 of 19 
states, the supreme court declared Shagar as the winner. But other parties rejected 
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FEDECO’s interpretation and Awolowo the flag bearer of Unity Party of Nigeria, on 
August 1979, challenged in court the election of Shagari as President elect.17 
 Although the court case was an important part of the final decision on the 
controversy over the interpretation of what constituted 2/3of 19 states and the 
declaration of Shagari as the President-elect, the Obasanjo government was not 
comfortable with the new development. The government envisaged that the court case, 
if allowed to take its full course was likely to result in a postponement of the handling 
over date. Such a postponement would not be accepted by many people with in the 
National Party of Nigeria as well as within the military. Certainly, Obasanjo would not 
want to commit the same mistake that Gowon committed which led to the overthrow of 
his government in 1975. It was in order to guide against such set back that Obasanjo 
influenced the concluding part of the electoral process, when he stated clearly that his 
government would not stay one day longer in office, because the government was 
committed to installing an elected government on October 1, 1979 and would not 
tolerate any act that was capable of diverting that goal.18 
 Thus, Obasanjo remained resolute on the commitment of his government to end 
the transition, programme on October 1, 1979, such that while the case over the 
declaration of Shagari was still in the Supreme Court, Obasanjo had begun the handling 
over process, which culminated in a colourful ceremony on October 1, 1979. To this 
extent, Obasanjo made history as the first military head of state to fulfill his promise of 
handing over power on the stipulated date, which ushered in, the second republic. 
 
The Military Governments of General Muhammadu Buhari and General Ibrahim 
Badamosi Babangida 
 
On December 31, 1983, the military over threw the Shagari government, thereby 
brought an end to the three year old second republic. General Buhari became the 
military head of state.19But the government never made any promise not commitment 
on transition programme. Rather the government focused more attention to the 
economy which was already declining. In fact the Shagari government, before its 
overthrow was already negotiating a world bank/IMF loan before it was over thrown. 
 Having stayed in office for up to a year, the Buhari government should have 
learnt from the Gowon government that failure to address the issue of transition was 
dangerous. By proposing a transition programmes, and releasing the programme to the 
public, the Buhari government would have kept the people busy while the government 
continued with its war against corruption and trying to put the economy on track. 
Certainly, the transition programme would have triggered a coup plot. And so without 
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the programme in place, the government was toppled after working for 16months. It 
was replaced on August 27, 1985 with the government headed by Badamosi 
Babangida.20 
 Before becoming the head of state, Babangida was part of all the military and 
civilian governments in Nigeria since 1975. He was involved in the 1975, 1983 and 1985 
military coups. At the same time, he was part of the Muhammed, Obasanjo and Buhari 
government as he held various important military positions. In 1985, he was the Chief 
of Army staff during the government of Buhari, which he plotted and overthrew. 
Therefore, Babangida had sufficient experience to know that the issue of transition was 
paramount for any military that was desirous of keeping itself in power without fear of 
military coup and with cooperation from the civilian political class. 
 On January 10, 1986, in a nationwide broadcast, Babangida promised to embark 
on a transition to civil rule programme by setting up the Political Bureau,21 to conduct 
open air debate on a viable political order for Nigeria from the report of the Bureau, the 
government produced the most elaborate and detailed transition to Civil rule 
programme beginning from third quarter 1987 to fourth quarter 1992 with the 
presidential election and swearing-in of the new President.22 The government 
promulgated the Decree No19 of 1987 known as political transition to civil rule decree.23 
In his address to the members of the Constituent Assembly, Babagida cautioned that his 
government would introduce civilian government at the state level between 1990 and 
199224 and that the Assembly should steer clear from certain national issues such as 
state creation, alteration of Nigeria’s political order in matters like Federalism, 
Presidentialism, adoption of state religion and fundamental human right.25 The 
government also prevented discussions on the adoption two party system and 
disqualification or ban on certain persons from taking part in politics. 
 The restrictions placed on the Constituent Assembly drew criticisms from groups 
and individuals. It appeared that the government had already pre-determined the 
outcome of the work of the Constituent Assembly. Also, the ban on certain politicians 
was seen as a ploy by the government to prevent them from participating in politics. It 
was also viewed as the strategy of the government to perpetuate itself in power. 
Whichever was the case, it was clear that the government was not sincere and genuinely 
committed to a true and enduring transition programme. Another action of the 
government which reinforced the view that it was not sincere and genuinely committed 
to a true transition was the formation of two political parties by the government on 
August 27, 1989. The two political parties, i.e. Social Democratic Party (SDP) and 
National Republican Convention (NRC) were recommended by the Political Bureau 
and funded by the government.26 
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 By forming and funding the two political parties, the government had total 
influence and control over their activities and their leadership. For instance, the two 
leaders of the parties: Chief Tom Ikimi of National Republican Convention and Alhaji 
Babagana Kingibe of Social Democratic Party were appointed by the government and 
were therefore answerable to the government.27 And so, those who were not in the good 
books of the government were not given appointments and portfolio in the parties. 
However, the transition programme was followed step by step. Between 1990 and 1992, 
elections were conducted from the local government up to the national assembly. All 
those who won those elections were sworn-in to officers as Senator Iyorchia Ayo 
emerged as the Senate President in 1992. The last election was the Presidential election. 
The first party primaries were cancelled by the government leading to an alteration of 
the final hand over date in June 1992.28 The cancellation was based on flimsy excuses 
given by the government. 
 The cancellation further raised the doubt on the sincerity of the government to 
handover power. The election and the handing over date were postponed to June 1993. 
Eventually the election held. But when the results were about to be announced on June 
23, 1993 the government announced the annulment of the election29 that was considered 
as the freest, fairest and most peaceful election ever conducted in Nigeria since 1960. 
The annulment was a confirmation of all the doubts that people had been expressing on 
the sincerity and genuiness of the commitment of Babangida to hand over power. This 
confirmation was also based on some statements credited to him. For instance as far 
back as April 5, 1989, while accepting the report of the draft constitution stated that he 
would not handover political power to any person or persons no matter how 
distinguished or wealthy but to a virile political organization that would use power in 
the national interest.30 Again at the National Institute for Policy and Strategy Studies, 
(NIPSS) Kuru Babangida was reported as saying that “though he does not know who he 
will hand over power to, he surely knows those who will not succeed him”.31 
 Since Babangida had already made up his mind on whom he would not hand 
over power to, then it follows that he was ready to truncate the democratic process if 
that would enable him achieve his plan. The two presidential candidates for June 
election were MKO Abiola for Social Democratic Party and Bashir Tofa for National 
Republican Convention.32From all indications Abiola of SDP won the annulled 
presidential election. By relating the statements to the annulment of the elections, there 
is no doubt that the government was aware of the possible outcome of the election and 
as such had decided not to hand over to the winner, Abiola. This action negated the 
principle of democracy which is the popular will of the people expressed in a free and 
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fair election. Perhaps the government would still not have accepted the outcome of the 
election if Bashir Tofa, the NRC presidential candidate had won. 
 Certainly, the government made mockery of the entire transition programme. It 
decided to find fault only when it wanted. The government attributed the annulment to 
election malpractices and allegation of irregularities.33The government played the 
waiting game when it over-looked cases of irregularities report in previous elections. 
There was all round criticism and condemnation of the government’s truncation of the 
transition programme. For instance Alli stated that military by 1993 failed in economic 
management and transition34 Also Nwankwo lamented the aborted transition 
programme and described it as a “show of shame” and questioned the sincerity of the 
military towards the transition programme.35 Similarly, Fawehinmi, in an interview 
stated that “the military regime never had any intention of abdicating from office” and that 
Babangida had the habit of deceiving Nigerians so as to be asked to stay in office as a 
part of his hidden agenda.36 In his own reaction, Olusegun Obasanjo cautioned against 
the prolongation of military rule so as to bring the Armed Forces into utter disrepute 
and not amount to a war against the sovereign rights of the people to choose their 
leaders in accordance with the constitution.37 Henry Nwosu, the National Electoral 
Commission Chairman barred his mind on the annulment when he stated that the 
election was free, fair and credible and if the government had upheld it, it would have 
conferred on Babangida government the greatest reservoir of legitimacy no regime had 
ever enjoyed in Nigeria.38 
 There was nationwide outrage and worldwide condemnation of the annulment 
of the election. In several parts of Nigeria, violent protests took place. And when Abiola 
declared himself winner of the June 12, 1993 election, he was arrested. Soon later, 
Babangida announced his retirement from the military and his stepping aside as the 
President on August 26, 1993. This clearly shows that Babangida’s lack of sincerity and 
genuine commitment to his own promise to hand over power in a transition 
programme forced him out of power, on August 26, 1993, a day to the August 27, 1993 
proposed date of handing over to an elected civil government. 
 
The Governments of Ernest Shonekan and Sani Abacha 
 
Following his “stepping aside,” Babangida formed an Interim National Government to 
hold brief for the military government until a fresh presidential election was conducted 
and a handing over was done on 31 December 1994. The interim national government 
was a desperate move by the failed Babangida government to conduct a fresh election 
and install a new president as a way of completing the transition programme. Also 
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Babangida had to vacate office because he had failed in his bid to succeed himself as a 
civilian president while at the same time, he lost the support of the military which he 
relied upon.39 
 The interim national government could not proceed with the election process for 
the presidential election. It attempted to solve the problem of confusion and uncertainty 
expressed by Nigerians. It was in the midst of these challenges that Abacha took over 
power on November 17, 1993 following the resignation of Ernest Shonekan.40The role of 
Abacha in the interim national government needs to be carefully examined. It should be 
noted that when Babangida stepped aside, the entire top military officers, including all 
members of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) left office except Abacha. Why 
was this so? Again, when the interim national government was formed there was no 
decree to give it any legitimacy or to back up its functions and actions. Was this 
deliberately done in order to weaken the powers of the Head of the Interim 
government? Another dilemma that Shonekan faced as the head of the interim 
government was the fact that the Babangida government did not accord Shonekan with 
the powerful title and authority of a commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of 
Nigeria. That power and authority resided in principle with Abacha who was then the 
chief of army staff. 
 It follows from the above that Sani Abacha and the interim national government 
were an extension of the Babangida government, put in place to forestall any military 
coup and to pave the way for the handing over to Babangida himself. Since 
Babangidahad earlier stood aside, he hoped to stand in again. But by November 1993, it 
became certain that the centre could no longer hold for both Shonekar and Abacha. 
Both could no longer work together to keep the dream of Babangida. The difference 
between the two trusted principal personalities came into the open on Novemberf 17, 
1993 when Shoneken was reported to have resigned as head of interim government and 
Abacha emerged as head of a new military government. 
 The rise of Abacha was a master stroke which put to rest the transition 
programmed by Babangida. This was brought to light in the maiden address of Abacha 
to the nation. He dissolved the interim national government along with the national 
and state assemblies and all the other elected offices in the state and local government 
levels, including the ban on political activities and the dissolution of all political parties. 
He did not promise to embark on a transition programme immediately. It took the new 
government several months to come up with the decision to embark on transition 
programme. So on June 27, 1994, the government inaugurated the constitutional 
conference, but two major issues emerged from the conference. What the government 
would do with the June 12, 1993 presidential election, the issue of rotational president, 
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and issue of state creation. So on October 1, 1995 Abacha announced the transition to 
civil rule programme. And in a year later, October 1, 1998, Abacha created 6 more 
states. The transition programme extended from October 1995 to October 1, 1998 with 
the swearing in of the elected president.42The programme was as extended as the 
Babangida’s transition programme covering a period of three years. Then the National 
Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) registered five political parties out of 
eighteen parties namely United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), committee for 
National consensus (CNC), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), Democratic 
Movement (GDM) 43. 
 The guidelines given to political parties were considered too stringent and so 
frustrated thirteen other parties from registration cities of the government cited such 
stringent guidelines for registration as:  1. that political parties must have 40,000 
members in each of the 30 states of the federation and 15,000 in the federal capital 
territory, Abuja and 2. Politicalparties N500,000 to NECON.44 Only very few and 
specially favoured party could fulfill those conditions or guideline. It was a way 
eliminating all possible opposition parties, so that government could actualize its 
hidden agenda. It was, in fact gathered that it was only the United Nigeria Congress 
Party, UNCP, out the five registered party that produced its party constitution and 
manifesto. This implies that it was only one party that really fulfilled all the guideline 
for registration. It is also interesting to note that none of the five parties had picked a 
presidential flag bearer before the issue of consensus candidate unfolded. These 
developments pointed to the fact that the Abacha government, just like the Babangida 
government was not showing signs of commitment and sincerity to the transition 
programme. 
 Further developments confirmed that Abacha planned to succeed himself by 
transforming into a civilian president. He began to unfold his plans in March 1997 
when David Attah, Abacha’s chief press secretary called on Nigerians to pressurize 
Abacha to run for presidency. This call, signaled the campaign by several pro-Abacha 
groups, calling on Sani Abacha to run for presidency. Among the groups were: (a) 
Movement for Abacha for President led by Orji Uzor Kalu of UNCP, (b) National 
Mobilization and Persuation Campaign (NMPC) led by GDM member, Godwin Daboh, 
(c) Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) led by Daniel Kanu, (d) General Sani 
Abacha Movement for Peaceful and Successful Transition Programme (GESAM) led by 
Abayomi Owuade. 
 As the various campaigns commenced, Sani Abacha denied having hand in the 
campaigns as he had not given thought to the idea of running for the presidency. 
However, Don Etiebet, former Minister of Petroleum who declared his intention to run 
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for the presidency, was on March 16, 1997 arrested for using his party for confronting 
and black mailing his opponents. After his release, he renounced his presidential 
ambition.45 
 From March 1998 to June 1998, the pro Abacha political groups began incessant 
campaigns for Abacha to declare his intention to run for presidency in the country. For 
instance in March 3-4, 1998, the “pro-Abacha for President” associations organized 
what was called “the One-million-Man-March for Abacha” in Abuja.46The event was 
well publicized in all media channels in Nigeria and abroad. This was meant to 
mobilize the support of Nigerians for the plan of Abacha to transform as civilian 
president. The plan further unfolded in April 20, 1998 when, after a special national 
convention the five registered political parties announced the adoption of Abacha as the 
sole consensus candidate for the scheduled August 1998 presidential election.47The 
adoption of Abacha as the only presidential candidate by five political history of 
Nigeria. But like the Babangida transition drama, the adoption of Abacha as the 
consensus candidate for the presidency was an indication that the five political parties 
were government sponsored or government controlled. It shows that the leadership of 
the five parties were government stooges. 
 While the pro Abacha groups were campaigning for Abacha to transform from 
military head of state to civilian president, there were pro-democracy groups who were 
opposed to the campaigns. These groups included: NADECO whose chieftain, Bola Ige, 
described the five political parties that chose Abacha as a consensus candidate as the 
five fingers of a leaper: National Conscience Party led by Gani Fawehinmi, Committee 
for the Defence of Human Rights by Femi Falana; Civil liberty Organization and 
Campaign for Democracy. Several leaders of these groups and individuals were 
arrested and kept in detention, for flimsy reasons. Prominent among these people were 
Obasanjo, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Lawan Gwadabe, Abraham Adesanya, Ayo 
Adebanjo, Ganiyu Dawodu etc. 
 Suddenly the entire transition to civil rule drama came to an abrupt end on June 
8, 1998, when Abacha died. The nation was brought back to the starting line of 
transition to civil rule. The nation witnessed another wasted five years of military rule 
and five years of insincerity to transit power. The doubt of a sincere transition was 
created by the Abacha government due to the dramatic return of the military to power 
in November 1993. From the onset of the transition programme, the basic structures 
that would have ensured smooth peaceful and participatory transition to civil rule were 
either ignored or deliberately avoided by the Abacha government.48 By the examples of 
the Babangida and Abacha failed transition programmes, the image of the Nigerian 
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military governments was seriously dented. But since transition was not made, Nigeria 
was still held by the military in power. 
 
The Military Government of Abdulsalami Abubakar and Transition Programme June 
9, 1998-May 29, 1999 
 
Following the death of Sani Abacha, the Provisional Ruling Council met same date, 
June 8, 1998 and appointed Abdulsalami Abubakar as the head of state. In his maiden 
address to the Nation on July 20, 1998, he promised to set up a transition programme49 
with a now drastic action plan. The government termination the previous transition 
programme of Abacha including the political parties, the National Electoral 
Commission, and the political activities. The government released all political detainees 
and pardon Olusegun Obasanjo and Shehu Musa Yar'Adua while Oladipo Diya's death 
sentence was commuted to prison terms. 
 A new electoral body was formed, independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) headed by Maurice Iwu. It came up with a transition time table which 
terminated the transition programme on May 29, 1999 with the swearing-in of the 
elected president. In pursuing the transition programme, Abdulsalami was guided by 
the lessons learnt from the failures of the Babangida and the Abacha governments. He 
stuck to his programme, by ensuring it was not derailed or extended. Even though the 
time table was short, it was also concise. The last election which was the presidential 
election took place on February 27, 1999 and was won by Olusegun Obasanjo of the 
People's Democratic Party. He was sworn in to office as the Executive President and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces. 
 The success of the transition programme of the Abdulsalami government was 
demonstrated by the many lessons that Abdusalami was able to learn from the failures 
of the two previous military governments. Being a participant in the two previous 
military governments, Abdulsalami must have realized the big damage that the two 
failed transitions did to the image of the Nigerian military. So, finding himself as the 
head of another military government, he saw it as an opportunity to revive the good 
image of the military, by ensuring a smooth free and fair democratic process that led to 
the handing over power to a democratically elected government, at the exact date on 
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Conclusion 
 
Attempt has been made to examine the level of commitment of all the military 
governments in Nigeria between 1966 to 1999. A total of 8 military leaders headed 
governments with in the period of 30years. It was only the Buhari government that did 
not announce a transition programme nor expressed the desire to hand over power to a 
democratically elected government. So the Buhari government was outrightly not 
committed to a transition programme. Some military governments made promises 
during broadcasts to the nation. Others went beyond the promises by drawing up the 
election time table, and providing election details up to the handling over date. But 
ironically only two governments pursued the transition dates to the last election and the 
handing over dates. 
 As for the military governments that rolled out the transition programme but 
could not execute the programme to the last date, the Ironsi government and the 
Mohammed government were stopped by coups. Both heads of states were killed by 
the coup plotters. In the case of Ironsi, there was no commitment to transition because 
the head of state was yet to resolve the political crisis he inherited from the civil 
government of Tafawa Balewa and the crisis that arose due to the 1966 coup'de tat. 
Gowon, on his part, stated openly that he was not ready to hand over power in 1976. 
But Murtala Mohammed showed a high level of commitment to transition programme 
due primarily to the failure of Yakubu Gowon to honour his earlier promise. But the 
short period within which he began his transition programme was not enough to 
establish his sincerity to hand over to a truly democratically elected government. He 
could still have changed his plan as Gowon did. 
 In the case of Obasanjo, the failure of Gowon and the death of Muhammad 
motivated him to carry out the transition programme of Muhammed. He remained 
committed to the programme and saw its conclusion. But the overthrow of the Shagari 
government with its very first term, shows that the military was not sincere to put in 
place an enduring democratic government. The lack of sincerity was again 
demonstrated by the series of counter coups that followed the Buhari coup. Buhari did 
not even promise to hand over government neither did he introduce a transition 
programme. As for Babangida and Abacha, it was a clear case of insincerity that 
derailed their transition programmes as each of them attempted to transform from 
military head of state to civilian president. It was the failure of both of them that 
motivated Abdulsalami, just like Obasanjo, to quickly run through a transition 
programme that produced the present enduring democratic dispensation since 1999. 
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